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Some medical implants act autonomously: they assess the current
health status of a patient and administer treatment when appro-
priate. An improper treatment, however, can cause serious harm.
Here, the decision logic leading to the treatment relies on data
obtained from sensors — an inherently imperfect medium. Cop-
ing with these inaccuracies requires the logic to be robust in the
sense that slight perturbations in the measurements do not signif-
icantly alter the decision. Determining the extent to which an algo-
rithm is robust automatically does not scale well for complex and
opaque components. This is particularly problematic when ma-
chine learning is involved. Yet, the analysis is feasible for simpler
safety-related components such as a runtime monitor, which ob-
serves the system and intervenes in a treatment when necessary.
Its significantly lower complexity generally allows for providing
static guarantees on the runtime behavior of the monitor. Comple-
menting these guarantees with a robustness analysis constitutes a
major step toward certifiable medical cyber-physical systems con-
trolled by opaque, machine-learned components. Hence, this paper
reports on ongoing research in the direction of a robustness anal-
ysis for the runtime monitoring framework RTLola.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) use sensors to perceive their sur-
roundings. These are inherently imperfect both in terms of reli-
able timing and precision. Not only are single readings subject to
noise, outlier-readings can fail to reflect reality entirely. This is
especially relevant in a safety-critical context, such as for medi-
cal cyber-physical systems (MCPS). These systems need to be ro-
bust with respect to these inaccuracies such that measurement er-
rors cannot be responsible for improper treatment. As an example,
consider an artificial pancreas (AP) [6], which is equipped with
a sensor measuring the blood glucose level. A single reading of
200 dLmg−1 pre- and succeeded by readings ranging from 70 to
80 dLmg−1 does not warrant intervention. The component’s sus-
ceptibility to misbehave under such erroneous inputs is captured
by a notion of robustness [18]. A high level of robustness indicates
that subtle changes in the input do not significantly alter the out-
put.
Measuring the robustness is a computationally challenging task.
The complexity and opaqueness of controllers for CPS render this
task infeasible in general, particularly when machine learning is
involved. A substantially less complex, yet essential component is
a runtime monitor. The monitor is a separate component of the
MCPS which takes sensor measurements and control decisions to
assess the current state of the system. If this information indicates
that the system is close to an unsafe state, the monitor intervenes.
Concretely, it can prohibit an AP from falsely administering a dose
of insulin.
The monitor is a more light-weighted component compared to
the controller itself. While the controller has to find an appropriate
reaction to the situation at hand, the monitor merely validates the
decision. This allows a framework like RTLola [10] to employ a
transparent and mathematically rigorous approach to monitoring
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even in the complex setting of CPS. It is based on the RTLola spec-
ification languagewith formal semantics. The framework compiles
a specification into either a hardware description language [2]with
traceability annotations or a high-level programming languagewith
annotations enabling an automatic verification [11]. This lays a
foundation for comprehensible and thus certifiablemonitoring. The
language also enables an analysis that provides several guarantees
on the runtime behavior of the monitor, such as an upper bound on
the memory consumption. As a result, an RTLola monitor is able
to complement an opaque controller with mathematically sound
static guarantees.
Thiswork-in-progress paper reports on an extension of the suite
of static analyses for RTLola specifications. For this, itfirst presents
a formal definition of ε-δ -Robustness for stream-based languages
such as RTLola. Intuitively, it requires that an ε perturbation dis-
tributed over the set of sequences of input values alters the out-
put only by at most δ . The input perturbation follows a malicious
resource distribution model, i.e., arbitrarily many data points may
be changed provided the difference with respect to either the L1
or L∞ metric remains below ε . The second part of the work con-
cerned with devising an SMT encoding of the robustness property
for an RTLola specification. This allows an SMT solver such as z3
to automatically determine the robustness of the specification. A
preliminary empirical evaluation reveals that the running time of
the solver scales sufficiently well.
While the resource distribution model is particularly suited for
dealing with random noise, it is not the only sensible one. A con-
tinuation of this work also considers the outlier model, which al-
lows for a certain number of outliers, independent of their absolute
deviation from reality. A third model is the natural model. Here,
changes are not spurious and abrupt as are noise and outliers, but
gradual. This models a temporary but natural deviation from the
norm, such as the time leading up to a re-calibration of a sensor.
Figure 1 illustrates all three models. Note, that the choice depends
on the specifications: a natural increasemight indicate a critical sit-
uation and hence warrant an immediate response from the system.
Thus, robustness concerning natural perturbations is undesired.
1.1 Related Work
For safety-critical systems, trustworthiness plays an increasingly
important role. This includes traceability [1], certifiability [3], ver-
ification [15], and robustness. The former two are particularly hard
when neural networks are involved [5, 25], which happens increas-
ingly more often [16, 26]. Verification thereof is still in its early
stages with successes in autonomous driving [19], computer vi-
sion [20], and chaotic, continuous systems [23] and aircraft traf-
fic control [12]. Robustness is a complementary approach. It was
investigated for hybrid systems [22], i.e., systems with a mix of
discrete and continuous components, and internet-of-things de-
vices [14].
Analyzing the robustness of a runtime monitor scales signifi-
cantly better than analyzing the system itself. These monitors usu-
ally operate with respect to a formal specification language such
as a temporal logic. Dokhanchi et al. [9] monitor the robustness of
the past fragment of metric temporal logic [13]. In contrast to that,
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Figure 1: Illustration of three input perturbationmodels: re-
source allocationmodel in blue, outliermodel in purple, and
natural model in green. This paper presents the resource
distribution model.
which incorporates robustness in its language [28]. Their notion
of robustness, however, diverges from the one presented in this
paper. In their work a system is robust if a mild violation of the
assumptions on the input only translate to mild violations of the
guarantees provided by the system.
Other noteworthy robustness-related analyses are fuzzing [4]
and reliability metrics. The former executes the system at hand
with different inputs, subjecting them to slight systematic changes
between executions and compares their outputs. While this scales
well, it requires the system as a whole to be repeatedly executable
under controlled conditions and does not provide formal guar-
antees. Reliability metrics such as mean time between failure and
mean time to failure [27] provide insight into the expected failure
rates of a system. This analysis is on a more concrete level than
the one presented in this paper as it is concerned with factor like
hardware decay.
2 ROBUST RTLOLA
RTLola is a stream-based runtime monitoring framework revolv-
ing around a formal specification language of the same name. It
analyzes such a specification and generates an executable mon-
itor plus static guarantees on its runtime behavior. The RTLola
framework is a suitable target for a robustness analysis since it is
specifically designed for safety-critical CPS focusing on compre-
hensiveness and certifiability.
An RTLola specification consists of input and output streams,
as well as trigger declarations. An input stream represents a typed
data source of the monitor, such as a sensor. Output streams de-
clare how to filter and process input data to assess the state of
the system accurately. Lastly, triggers are boolean conditions upon
which satisfaction the monitor raises an alarm. This alarm can lead
to the initiation of emergency landings in aircraft or the interven-
tion regarding a spurious treatment in MCPS.
Consider the following excerpt of a specification for an AP.
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input glucose: UInt64
output clean_glucose := if glucose < 300
then glucose else clean_glucose.last(dft: 90)
trigger clean_glucose > 120 ∨ clean_glucose < 60
The specification declares an input stream containing the cur-
rent blood glucose level. The output stream clean_glucose filters sus-
pectedmeasurement-errors out of the glucose input. For this, it uses
a conditional statement producing either the currently measured
level or the last clean value. If such a last value does not exist, be-
cause the monitor was just started, then it uses the default value
instead. The trigger issues an alarm if the glucose level indicates
hyper- or hypoglycemia.
When disregarding the trigger, the specification is intuitively
robust, as illustrated in Figure 2.1
2.1 Robustness
The definition of robustness for an RTLola specification is based
on its models. Note that in terms of models, triggers constitute
boolean outputs, allowing us to refrain from treating them differ-
ently.
Definition 2.1 (Models and Validity). A model M = (I,O) of an
RTLola specification Φ is a set of finite sequences of values. Each
sequenceV ∗ ∈ I∪O represents either an input or an output stream
whereV is the domain of RTLola values. As a short-hand notation,
let in(M) = I, out(M) = O. Furthermore, let in(Φ) and out(Φ) pro-
vide the set of input and output streams of Φ, respectively. Finally,
Φ(I) = O denotes that a monitor for the specification Φ generates
O for the input sequences I. A modelM is valid for Φ, i.e.,M |= Φ
iff Φ(in(M)) = out(M).
Robustness states that mild variations in I only slightly alter
O. This requires a notion of distance for finite sequences. Hence,
let d : V ∗ ×V ∗ → R+ be a metric on vectors such as the L1 or L∞
metrics. Themulti-vector extension thereof isd∗ : (V ∗)n×(V ∗)n →
R+ for some n ∈ N with d∗(τ ,τ ′) = ∑ni=1 d(τi ,τ ′i ).
Definition 2.2 (ε-δ -Robustness). A specification Φ is ε-δ -robust
iff for any two modelsM andM ′ withM |= Φ andM ′ |= Φ:
d∗(in(M), in(M)) ≤ ε =⇒ d∗(out(M), out(M ′)) ≤ δ
Recall the example specification. When determining its robust-
ness, it is evident that a change in the input stream will either be
reflected identically in the output stream or be ignored entirely.
The latter case results in an ε-0-robustness, i.e., the monitor is fully
robust, whereas the former leads to an ε-ε-robustness. Hence, the
overall robustness disregarding the trigger is an ε-ε-robustness.
Remark. Note that boolean input and outputs — in particular
triggers — require a substantially different treatment than numeric
streams. The remainder of the paper only considers numeric values
until Section 5 outlines how to lift this restriction.
1Note that the sample trace illustrates the robustness, not necessarily a healthy
glucose-history.
3 SMT ENCODING
This section devices an SMT encoding for the robustness analy-
sis of an RTLola specification. The encoding is parameterized by
the bound ε and computes two models M and M . The length of
each stream is bounded by another input parameter n. The encod-
ing ensures that the input distance d∗(in(M), in(M)) remains be-
low ε while the output distance d∗(out(M), out(M)) is maximized.
To this end, it generates a fresh variable for each stream and po-
sition within the stream. Suppose I and O contain an id for each
stream. Then, for any stream s , the variable vsη represents its η-th
value with 0 < η ≤ n.
The next step is to encode the output stream expressions. For
this, let encη be a function that generates an SMT formula for theη-
th evaluation of an RTLola output stream expression. Here, arith-
metical and logical expressions, which include conditionals, are
straight-forward to encode. Stream accesses are replaced by the re-
spective variable representing the stream at a certain point in time.
As an example, suppose the expression of stream s requires access
to the last value of stream s ′. Then, encη (s) replaces the stream ac-
cess by vs
′
η−1. Note that in case η − 1 = 0, the encoding uses the
default value declared in the expression instead.
The last component of the encoding incorporates the distance
function. For this, it introduces a fresh variable δ . The translation
of the actual metric into SMT is straight-forward.
The final encoding requires two models,M andM . Let variables



































Encoding the running example for in(Φ) = {c}, out(Φ) = {д},
n = 2, and some ε results in the following:
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Remark. Note that the encoding is parameterized in both ε andn.
The latter is necessary because RTLola specifications can be cyclic as
a stream can access its own past values. In this case, well-definedness
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Figure 2: Sample input and output trace for the running example specification. When the glucose readings are in a “sane”
range, the output streammirrors the input. Values over the threshold of 300 are classified as outliers and thus ignored. Hence,
perturbations in the input result in lower or equal alterations in the output.
stems from the default values provided to last [7, 24]. Hence, the en-
coding unrolls the cyclic computation up ton. For some specifications,
the unrolling can find a fixed point, so increasing n cannot reveal a
greater level of robustness.
3.1 Interpretation of the SMT Output
If the SMT solver terminates, it will always yield a positive result
since an RTLola specification describes a computable, total func-
tion. A result of δ = 0 proves that the output of the monitor is
independent of the input. Note that a stream in such a specifica-
tion can still have different values in different positions; it can, for
example, count the number of times it was evaluated. Other than
that, the output is δ = αε where α is a polynomial of degree ≤ n
where each coefficient is a linear combination of scalars occurring
in the specification. If the degree is less than n, further increas-
ing n cannot lead to greater values of δ . If the degree is exactly n,
then limn→∞ δ can be∞ or be bound by a polynomial of a greater
degree than n.
4 EVALUATION
Even though the work is not fully mature, an evaluation allows for
estimating the feasibility for varying values ofn and different kinds
of specifications. The prototype implementation is written in Rust
and uses the open-source frontend of the RTLola framework2. It
uses the z33 [8] SMT solver as a backend.
All experiments were conducted on an Intel®Core™ i7-9750H
CPU running at 2.60GHz. The resource consumption when com-
puting the encoding of specifications was entirely negligible. Fig-
ure 3 reports the running times plotted against n for two different
specifications. Each dot is the average over 100 repetitions, super-
imposed by a Lowess trend line. The underlying specification for
the plot on the left-hand side is robust and monitors an artificial
pancreas similar albeit more complex than the running example.
The running time never exceeded 40 s for the L1 metric and 100 s
for the L∞ metric. When compared to the plot on the right-hand
side, the impact of n was relatively low. The reason behind this is
that its underlying specification is not robust, i.e., δ is unbounded.
Lastly, note that the choice of ε has no measurable impact on the
running time.
The bottom line of the evaluation is that the running time signif-
icantly worsens for non-robust specifications. Hence, determining
2Project: rtlola.org, Frontend: https://crates.io/crates/rtlola-frontend
3Frontend: https://crates.io/crates/z3
whether a specification is robust for some δ before-hand can im-
prove the applicability of the approach. However, even without
this information, the running time is sufficiently small to encour-
age a continuation of the work.
5 OUTLOOK
The algorithm outlined in this paper allows for analyzing the ro-
bustness of specifications composed of a subset of RTLola. There
are two major limitations, which will be addressed in future work:
asynchrony and proper treatment of non-numeric values.
5.1 Asynchrony
One major advantage of RTLola over its predecessor Lola [7] is
asynchrony. In Lola, every input stream receives a new value si-
multaneously, prompting the monitor to re-compute every output
stream. In RTLola, however, the monitor can receive partial in-
puts, i.e., only some inputs receive a new value. As a result, the
monitor only evaluates the relevant subset of outputs. Moreover,
some outputs are computed periodically, independent of the arrival
of input values.
The incorporation of periodic streams into the SMT encoding
is straight-forward. Asynchronous arrivals, however, severely in-
crease the degree of freedom for the SMT solver: each new value
is time-stamped, and between two values of a stream, there may
be an arbitrary amount of new values on another stream. Without
some limitations on the temporal behavior of streams, the SMT
solver might be unable to terminate within a reasonable time.
5.2 Robustness of Boolean Values
The computation of the robustness of the running example dis-
regarded the trigger due to its boolean nature. Nevertheless, the
specification contains three threshold checks, two in the trigger
and one in the conditional expression. The former are fragile by na-
ture: a glucose reading of 60 dLmg−1 is considered perfectly fine,
whereas for any ε ∈ R+, 60 − ε raises the alarm. This is intended
as the threshold precisely determines when a value is supposed to
be classified as problematic. Hence, the fragility of the range check
should not negatively influence the robustness. However, the other
check influences the numerically-valued output stream, rendering
it relevant for the robustness of the specification. Identifyingwhich
boolean checks need to be ignored and which do not is subject of
the ongoing work.
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Figure 3: Plots reporting on the running time as a function on n. The underlying specification for the plot on the left-hand
side is robust whereas the one for the right-hand side plot is not. Each dot is the average running time over 100 repetitions.
Superimposed: Lowess trend line.
5.3 Conclusion
Robustness is an important metric for safety-critical systems such
as MCPS. Determining the robustness of an RTLola specification
is aworthwhile goal since the framework focuses on improving the
certifiability of CPS particularly in presence of machine-learned
components. Past successes regarding integrating RTLola moni-
tors into low-resource environments such as autonomous drones
make it an intriguing candidatewhen designingMCPS. The promis-
ing results of the preliminary experimental evaluation suggest that
extensions to the encoding will still scale sufficiently well.
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